_002 John Locke & Personal Identity

 Most people know who they are. They can look in a mirror and recognise themselves. Most people can also recognise a photo of themselves taken a year ago, but might not be able to recognise themselves as a baby. The question is, are all 3 of these versions of yourself really “you”?

Before Locke, a common theory was that the body determines our identity. I am the same person as yesterday because I have the same body. The problem with this is that our cells are constantly replacing each other as time passes and my body is completely different to when I was a baby. We no longer share any of the same cells, but surely that doesn’t mean we are different people?

John Locke is a 17^th Century British philosopher who believed that memory of one’s thoughts and actions makes up personal identity. It is sameness of consciousness, not sameness of body. After all, we see in body swap movies like “Freaky Friday” or “The Change Up” that when they swap bodies, they are where their consciousness is. So as long as we remember our experiences and feelings in the past, we are still the same person.

This generates a few problems:

Breakfast Problem: What did you have for breakfast last week? You probably don’t remember. So the underlying point of the problem is that if we forget something, we cannot be the same person as he/she who did that thing. Locke’s response is to admit that we wouldn’t be exactly the same person, but we’d be close enough – we would still be the same human being but not identical to who we once were. So if someone suffers from amnesia to the extent that they forget everything about themselves, they are, according to Locke, a different person.

Brave Officer Problem: Jay Z began as a poor child (A) in a rough neighbourhood.

Then he grew up (B) and became a famous rapper, but he remembers the child he used to be.

Finally, he retired as a billionaire (C) trying to make Tidal happen. This last version of Jay Z remembers when he was a rapper, but has forgotten about the delinquent child he once was.

The problem is that if C remembers B who remembers A, then surely C must be identical to A. But C doesn’t directly remember A, only through B.

(If Eminem is Slim Shady and Slim Shady is Marshall Mathers, then Eminem must be Marshall Mathers).

So they are both identical and not identical.

Branching Problem: If you copied your consciousness into a robot, would both you and the robot be identical to your past self? Surely it is impossible for both of you to be identical to the past you, since the 2 of you are not identical to each other. Which one is the “real” you (if either)?

Locke’s theories clearly had flaws, but he should nevertheless be praised for drawing attention to this issue of personal identity.

Word Count:496

• Tipton, I.C., 1977, Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press